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[1267] 
Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution: 
Justice Ginsburg and Reconstructive Feminism 
Joan C. Williams* 
 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, since about 1980, has been painted as a feminist committed 
to “formal equality.” Recent work has contested this depiction. This Article uncovers 
additional evidence that Ginsburg’s goal was not mere formal equality; her goal was to 
deconstruct the breadwinner-homemaker system in which men and women were seen as 
belonging to separate spheres. Ginsburg saw this system as subordinating women, and in 
that sense is an antisubordination theorist. Yet lumping her together with Catharine 
MacKinnon, often seen as legal feminism’s foremost antisubordination theorist, proves 
confusing for a number of reasons. A chief difference is their attitudes towards men. 
While MacKinnon often paints men as oppressors, Ginsburg saw men, as well as women, 
oppressed by gender roles. Ginsburg is more accurately seen as a reconstructive feminist, 
whose chief goal is to deconstruct separate spheres—its breadwinner-homemaker roles 
and the descriptions of men and women that justify them—and to reconstruct gender 
along different lines. Today, progress towards her goal has stalled. The key to 
jumpstarting the stalled gender revolution is to change gender pressures on men. Much of 
this work involves cultural shift, but in recent years, progress has been made in litigating 
separate spheres under Title VII, as evidenced by the recent growth of litigation involving 
family responsibilities discrimination (“FRD”). The Article concludes with a critique of a 
recent FRD case, EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P.       
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Introduction 
For someone who has been called the Thurgood Marshall of 
women, who some say has had a greater impact on American law than 
any living judge,1 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has received remarkably 
little attention among legal feminists.2 For decades, she was consigned to 
the dustbin of formal equality, as someone obsessed with treating men 
and women the same under the law, to women’s detriment, even when 
the two groups were clearly different.3 More recently, Neil Siegel and 
Reva Siegel have contested that characterization, arguing that Justice 
Ginsburg should be seen through an antisubordination lens.4 Siegel and 
Siegel make an important point. As we shall see in Part I, Ginsburg 
consistently used antisubordination language not just in the Struck v. 
Secretary of Defense5 brief analyzed by Siegel and Siegel, but in many 
briefs dating from that period. In retrospect, it is a bit shocking that 
scholars, for so long, looked at the judicial opinions that bleach out 
Ginsburg’s antisubordination language almost completely as evidence of 
what early legal feminists thought.6 
 
 1. Peter J. Rubin, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Judge’s Perspective, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 825, 825 
(2009). 
 2. Cf. Tony Mauro, Ginsburg Nominated: “Thurgood Marshall of Gender Equality Law,” USA 
Today, June 15, 1993, at 1A. 
 3. See, e.g., Judith Baer, Advocate on the Court: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Limits of Formal 
Equality, in Rehnquist Justice: Understanding the Court Dynamic 216, 231 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 
2003). 
 4. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 Duke L.J. 771, 774 (2010). See generally Neil S. Siegel, 
“Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision, 43 New Eng. L. Rev. 799 (2009). 
 5. 409 U.S. 1071 (1972). 
 6. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 3, at 231. 
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But while it is more accurate to see Ginsburg as focused on 
antisubordination than as focused on empty formal equality, that 
characterization, too, ultimately proves confusing. If you compare 
Ginsburg’s approach with that of Catharine MacKinnon, legal feminism’s 
foremost antisubordination theorist, the limitations of lumping the two 
under a single name become readily apparent. The most obvious 
divergence concerns their attitudes towards men. Men, in MacKinnon’s 
vision, are subordinators.7 Ginsburg sees men in a far more sympathetic 
light, as people whose lives are also impoverished by traditional gender 
roles.8 Ginsburg’s use of antisubordination language proves not that she 
is in MacKinnon’s camp, but that MacKinnon does not have a monopoly 
on the insight that gender “differences” involve gender hierarchy. 
Ginsburg is best understood as a reconstructive feminist, with a very 
concrete vision of what the world would look like if gender roles changed 
as she thinks they should. Cary Franklin argues persuasively that 
Ginsburg brought over from her studies in Sweden the view that gender 
roles choke off the human potential of men as well as women.9 Ginsburg, 
from the beginning, has been guided by a very concrete vision of what 
men’s and women’s lives will look like following a whole-scale 
dismantling of separate spheres. Part II explores this interpretation of 
Ginsburg as a reconstructive feminist on the work-family axis.10 
Part III picks up where Justice Ginsburg left off. Sadly, the past 
fifteen years have seen a stall in the gender-role revolution Justice 
Ginsburg helped to spark. To jumpstart that stalled revolution, I argue 
that contemporary feminism should follow her example and place 
masculinity at the center of a reconstructive analysis. Studies of 
masculinity, unavailable in Ginsburg’s ACLU days, point the way. This 
topic is discussed in Part III.A. 
Research not available in Ginsburg’s ACLU days also documents 
that change for men needs to be matched with change for mothers, a 
topic discussed in Part III.B. Recent studies document that 
discrimination against mothers, called “maternal wall bias,” is by far the 
strongest and most open form of gender bias.11 Part III introduces this 
social science and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
 
 7. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality 769 (2001) (“[S]exual subjection [by men] is 
integral to sexuality as normally experienced . . . .”). 
 8. See infra notes 74–78. 
 9. Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 
85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 97–104 (2009). 
 10. Joan C. Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do 
About It 4–6 (2000). 
 11. Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 
112 Am. J. Sociology 1297, 1297 (2007); Faye J. Crosby, Joan C. Williams & Monica Biernat, The 
Maternal Wall, 60 Soc’y for Psychol. Study Soc. Issues 675, 677 (2004). 
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(“EEOC”) 2007 enforcement guidance on caregiver discrimination,12 
which together have catalyzed a rapidly growing area of employment law 
that protects the rights of mothers to work and fathers to participate in 
family care. This Article ends with a more sustained analysis of a recent 
important case that is fundamentally inconsistent with the lessons Justice 
Ginsburg taught us: EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P.13 
I.  Ginsburg as an Antisubordination Theorist? 
Reva Siegel and Neil Siegel are dead right to link Justice Ginsburg 
with antisubordination rhetoric. The Struck brief upon which Siegel and 
Siegel focus this attention is not an aberration.14 If one examines the 
briefs from the landmark 1970s cases Ginsburg was involved with under 
the auspices of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, they are replete with 
antisubordination rhetoric. 
The 1971 amicus brief Ginsburg co-wrote in Reed v. Reed uses the 
terms “inferior,” “subordinate,” “subordination,” and “second-class” 
repeatedly.15 For example, she wrote: “American women have been 
stigmatized historically as an inferior class and are today subject to 
pervasive discrimination.”16 In 1972, in the case that was to become 
Frontiero v. Richardson, Ginsburg and co-authors used the terminology 
“subordination” or “inferiority” twelve times, reiterating that 
“[h]istorically, women have been treated as subordinate and inferior to 
men.”17 Relying heavily on the new social history, the brief recalls that 
“[t]he common law heritage, a source of pride for men, marked the wife 
as her husband’s chattel, ‘something better than his dog, a little dearer 
than his horse.’”18 “Prior to the Civil War,” it continues, “[Southern] 
white women ranked as chief slave of the harem.”19 “Activated by 
feminists of both sexes, legislatures and courts have begun to recognize 
and respond to the subordinate position of women in our society and the 
second-class status our institutions historically have imposed upon 
them.”20 Gender subordination continues up to the present day, the brief 
argues. “The challenged classification . . . assumes that the man is the 
 
 12. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with 
Caregiving Responsibilities (2007).  
 13. 778 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 14. See generally Siegel & Siegel, supra note 4. 
 15. Brief for Appellant at 10, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4) (“[T]he distance to 
equal opportunity for women—in the face of pervasive, social, cultural, and legal roots of sex-based 
discrimination—remains considerable.” (footnote omitted)). 
 16. Id. at 25. 
 17. Brief of ACLU Amicus Curiae, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (No. 71-1694). 
 18. Id. at 13 (quoting Alfred Lord Tennyson, Locksley Hall, in Poems (1842)). 
 19. Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20. Id. at 18. 
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dominant partner in a marriage and that the woman occupies a 
subordinate position . . . .”21 
The Struck brief, also written in 1972, sounds many of the same 
notes. It decries “the subordinate position of women in our society and 
the second-class status our institutions historically have imposed upon 
them.”22 Women are “relegated to an inferior legal status”;23 like blacks, 
they have “the stigma of inferiority and second-class citizenship 
associated with them.”24 This brief again relies heavily on nonlegal 
materials: “For if women have only a place, clearly the rest of the world 
must belong to someone else and, therefore, in default of God, to men.”25 
The “presumably well-meaning exultation”26 of women “has impelled 
them to accept a dependent subordinate status in society.”27 “Man’s 
domination of woman” is referred to as an “historic fact.”28 
The 1973 brief in Kahn v. Shevin sounds the antisubordination 
theme yet again. Following the “grandmother brief,” it again asserts, 
“Historically, women have been treated subordinate and inferior to 
men.”29 Kahn involved a tax exemption offered to widows but not 
widowers. Ginsburg and her co-authors warned that “favors of this kind 
come at an exorbitant price,”30 citing in the footnote Sarah Grimke’s 
famous line (beloved of MacKinnon): “We ask no favors for our sex. All 
we ask of our brethren is that they take their feet off our necks . . . .”31 
The tax exemption, which appeared to benefit women, “perpetuates sex 
stereotypes and thereby retards women’s access to equal opportunity and 
economic life.”32 This is understandable, given that so few women are in 
politics and therefore that “laws are drafted from masculine perspective.”33 
I could go on and on. Suffice it to say that the notion that Ginsburg 
wanted lily-livered formal equality is woefully ill-informed. In retrospect, 
 
 21. Id. at 24. 
 22. Brief for the Petitioner at 27, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178). 
 23. Id. at 29. 
 24. Id. at 30. The constant analogies to race today seem dicey. They seemed less so in the 1970s. 
Recall that it was Pauli Murray, a black feminist, who championed the race-sex analogy. See generally 
Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 232 (1965). At the same time, Ginsburg and her colleagues were lobbying hard to 
persuade the Court to apply strict scrutiny, which had been developed in the context of race, to sex. 
 25. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 22, at 38 n.35 (quoting Elizabeth Janeway, Man’s 
World, Woman’s Place: A Study in Social Mythology (1971)). 
 26. Id. at 38. 
 27. Id. at 9. 
 28. Id. at 41. 
 29. Brief for Appellants at 4, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1973) (No. 73-78). 
 30. Id. at 16. 
 31. Id. at 16 n.11; see Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and 
Law 45 (1987). 
 32. Brief for Appellants, supra note 29, at 18. 
 33. Id. at 25. 
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I am shocked that so many of us—myself included—read the Supreme 
Court opinions in early equal protection cases as evidence of what 
feminists thought rather than as evidence of what they could get Eight 
White Guys to accept.34 
The early legal feminists not only embraced antisubordination 
language, they kept on using it even after it became clear that their 
antisubordination language did not appeal to the Supreme Court. In 
1979, Ginsburg wrote (along with a lawyer at her husband Marty’s firm, 
Weil, Gotshal & Manges) a brief in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual 
Insurance Co., which involved a challenge to a Missouri workers’ 
compensation law that offered automatic death benefits for the spouse of 
a male worker, but required spouses of female workers to prove 
incapacity or dependence.35 Statutes that offer “purported favors to 
females as men’s appendages,” Ginsburg wrote in the brief, “downgrade 
women’s status as workers and, in the cumulative effect, dampen 
women’s aspirations and limit their opportunities,”36 by perpetuating a 
“familiar stereotype—the dominant, independent man/subordinate, 
dependent woman.”37 The brief complains that the equation of “widow” 
with “dependent surviving spouse . . . reflects a traditional way of 
thinking about females as inferior to males”38 and that the statute reflects 
“archaic and overbroad generalizations about men as breadwinners and 
women as dependents” dating from an era when “those in positions of 
power accepted as axiomatic women’s subordination to men.”39 Ginsburg 
and her co-author decried the “old accepted rules and customs 
purportedly favoring women do so only in conjunction with a view of 
them as men’s appendages.”40 These gals were antisubordination 
firebrands. 
 
 34. Thurgood Marshall was not the problem. He understood that change needed to come at a 
structural level, as evidenced in his decision in California Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) (“The entire thrust . . . behind this legislation [the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act] is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without 
denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family life.” (quoting 123 Cong. Rec. 
29,658 (1977))). Note how Marshall’s formulation neatly explains why treating women “the same” 
entailed upholding their right to pregnancy disability leave; his language parsimoniously deconstructs 
the masculine norm that “real” workers do not bear children. 
 35. Brief Amicus Curiae ACLU, Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1979) (No. 79-
381), 1979 WL 199959. 
 36. Id. at *3. 
 37. Id. at *10. 
 38. Id. at *19. 
 39. Id. at *35–36. 
 40. Id. at *45. 
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II.  Ginsburg as a Reconstructive Feminist41 
But they were not firebrands like MacKinnon. Just ask MacKinnon 
herself: “I think the fatal error of the legal arm of feminism has been its 
failure to understand that the mainspring of sex inequality is misogyny 
and the mainspring of misogyny is sexual sadism.”42 MacKinnon’s focus 
had been on sex, and in particular, one unhealthy kind of sex: the 
eroticizing of dominance, whether through sexual harassment,43 
pornography,44 or rape.45 In MacKinnon’s view, “the eroticization of 
dominance and submission [is what] creates gender.”46 Or, more 
famously, “sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism.”47 
The conventional view within legal feminism is that “the sexual 
realm is where dominance theory has the most to offer.”48 But this is 
untrue. Both Ginsburg and MacKinnon are antisubordination feminists. 
And yet lumping them together proves confusing. For one thing, 
MacKinnon and Ginsburg are interested in different axes of gender.49 
MacKinnon focuses on the linkage of sexuality and dominance, while 
Ginsburg’s chief concern was with work and family. Virtually all of the 
cases in which Ginsburg involved the ACLU Women’s Rights Project 
were challenges to the breadwinner-homemaker dyad. By my quick 
 
 41. This is not to say that no difference exists between Ginsburg and contemporary reconstructive 
feminists. Ginsburg’s thinking was framed around the problems she faced, namely the need to 
eliminate statutes that explicitly enforced sex-role stereotypes. Her solution was to eliminate gender as 
a factor “in determining the legal rights of men and women.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the 
Constitution, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1975). This kind of statement ultimately proved confusing, 
particularly because of Ginsburg’s strategic decision to use the word “gender” rather than “sex.” Id. 
at 1. Does this statement mean that people should never use sex (body shape) as a way of allocating 
legal rights, or that they should never use gender (sex role) as a way of allocating legal rights? In my 
view, Ginsburg meant the first but not the second. For example, the ACLU brief in Orr v. Orr, 440 
U.S. 268 (1979) (No. 77-1119), clearly advocated that anyone who played the caregiver role should be 
entitled to alimony (that legal rights should follow sex role rather than body shape). This is what her 
do-not-use-sex-as-a-proxy language was designed to communicate, as was her insistence on a “change 
from gender to functional description.” Ginsburg, supra, at 12, 24. The understanding of Ginsburg and 
others of her generation as “formal equality” feminists stems in significant part from the assumption 
that when they said that legal rights should not follow gender, they meant that women marginalized by 
caregiving should not have legal rights. This interpretation is understandable, but incorrect. 
 42. MacKinnon, supra note 29, at 5. 
 43. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979). 
 44. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 
793, 796 (1991). 
 45. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International 
Dialogues (2006). 
 46. MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 50. 
 47. Id. at 48. 
 48. Katharine T. Bartlett & Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Law: Theory, Doctrine, 
Commentary 282 (5th ed. 2010). 
 49. Joan C. Williams, Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter 110–
15 (2010) (identifying three axes of gender: work-family, sex-violence, and queer). 
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count, twelve out of fourteen of these early cases aimed at disestablishing 
the men-as-breadwinner-women-as-dependent-caregiver paradigm of 
separate spheres.50 In cases that did not directly involve the breadwinner-
homemaker dyad, the ACLU briefs focus on deconstructing the 
descriptions of men and women that justify the breadwinner as the 
“natural” role for men and the caregiver as the “natural” role for 
women.51 Ginsburg’s message was, and has always been, that men can be 
caregivers and women can be breadwinners, and (to quote her former 
clerks Susan Williams and David Williams) that “we are human beings 
with a full emotional palette even in the workplace, and we are thinking, 
analyzing people, even at home.”52 
The second major difference between these two antisubordination 
theorists is their attitude towards men. MacKinnon typically paints men 
as oppressors, pure and simple. Men, MacKinnon tells us, do not want to 
hear that Linda Lovelace (of Deep Throat) did not like the sex; “[m]en 
 
 50. See Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (challenging a pension system that charged 
women more than men on the grounds that they live longer). For analysis of how this relates to 
separate spheres, see Williams, supra note 49, at 129–30; see also Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 
446 U.S. 142 (1980) (challenging a workers’ compensation law that offered automatic death benefits to 
wives but required husbands to prove incapacity or dependency); Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76 
(1979) (challenging a welfare program that offered benefits to the families of unemployed men but not 
to the families of unemployed women); Orr. v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (challenging an alimony law 
that limited alimony to women); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (challenging an 
employer’s policy of denying seniority status to women returning from pregnancy leave); Vorchheimer 
v. Sch. Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1976) (challenging an all-boys public school and stressing the career 
benefits to girls of attending the school); Mathews v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1976) (challenging a 
social security survivor benefits program that required surviving males, but not females, to prove 
dependence); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1974) (challenging the denial of 
pregnancy benefits in a comprehensive insurance scheme); Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1974) 
(challenging a system that allowed women to opt out of jury service on grounds of their family 
responsibilities); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1974) (challenging a social security survivor 
benefits program that limited eligibility to widows); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) 
(challenging a military program that offered medical and other benefits automatically to the wives of 
servicemembers, but required husbands to prove dependence); Struck v. Sec’y of Defense, 410 U.S. 
1921 (1972) (challenging an Air Force officer’s discharge due to her pregnancy); Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (challenging a statute that gave automatic preference to men over women in 
administering relatives’ estates). The two cases I found for which the Women’s Rights Project wrote 
briefs that did not deconstruct separate spheres were Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), and Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Ginsburg was vociferous that she did not support the bringing of the 
lawsuit in Craig v. Boren and only got involved to protect the gains attained in other cases. 
 51. See generally Motion of ACLU for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus 
Curiae, Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (No. 75-628) (arguing that the Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 
3.2% beer to men younger than 21 and to women younger than 18 reinforced imagery of women as 
passive and men as active risk takers); Brief Amici Curiae for the ACLU, Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (No. 75-
5444) (challenging the death penalty for rape, which stressed that rule’s linkage with the tradition of 
women as property (and racism)). 
 52. Susan H. Williams & David C. Williams, Sense and Sensibility: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 
Mentoring Style as a Blend of Rigor and Compassion, 20 U. Haw. L. Rev. 589, 593 (1998). 
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believe what turns them on” (that is, eroticized violence).53 Occasionally 
MacKinnon acknowledges differences among men54 but these moments 
are fleeting. MacKinnon pays little attention to distinguishing between 
men and the unhealthy traditions of masculinity she critiques so searingly 
well: MacKinnon’s view is that “what turns men on, what men find 
beautiful, is what degrades women.”55 When men sexually harass women, 
she notes, “[i]t doesn’t mean they all want to fuck us, they just want to 
hurt us, dominate us, and control us, and that is fucking us.”56 No wonder 
MacKinnon’s view is that women are “born, degraded, and die.”57 
Ginsburg’s view of men could not be more different. Thanks to Cary 
Franklin’s brilliant excavations, we now know that Ginsburg brought her 
views on gender over from the Sweden of the 1960s, where a full-fledged 
assault had been launched to deconstruct the separate spheres’ dichotomy 
between men, defined as beings whose nature suited them perfectly for 
market work and public life, and women, defined as beings whose nature 
suited them perfectly for family work and private life.58 The goal in Sweden 
was to effect structural changes in the organization of market work and 
family work and in the ideology of what men and women are “really like,” 
to enable both men and women to live up to their full human potential, 
freed from the straitjacket of conventional gender roles.59 Swedish 
advocates argued that “imprisonment in the masculine role is at least as 
great a problem to men as conformity to a feminine ideal is to women” and 
“that a debate on liberation and equality must be about how men as well 
as women are forced to act out socially determined stereotypes.”60 
This very precisely describes Ginsburg’s reconstructive vision: 
[W]ere I Queen, my principal affirmative action plan would have three 
legs. First, it would promote equal educational opportunity and 
effective job training for women, so they would not be reduced to 
dependency on a man or the state. Second, my plan would give men 
encouragement and incentives to share more evenly with women the 
joys, responsibilities, worries, upsets, and sometimes tedium of raising 
children from infancy to adulthood. (This, I admit, is the most 
challenging part of the plan to make concrete and implement.) Third, 
the plan would make quality day care available from infancy on. 
 
 53. MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 11. 
 54. Id. at 41 (“Men who do not rape women . . . . Men who are made sick by pornography . . . .”). 
 55. Id. at 91. 
 56. Id. at 92. 
 57. Id. at 45. 
 58. Franklin, supra note 9, at 97–105. Justice Ginsburg views reproductive rights through the 
same prism, namely a concern that laws limiting reproductive rights may impede a woman’s ability “to 
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.” See Mickey Kaus, Moderate Threat, 
New Republic, July 12, 1993, at 6 (quoting Justice Ginsburg). 
 59. Franklin, supra note 9, at 100. 
 60. Id. at 101 (quoting Hilda Scott, Sweden’s “Right to Be Human”: Sex-Role Equality: The 
Goal and the Reality 43 (1982)).  
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Children in my ideal world would not be women’s priorities, they 
would be human priorities.61 
During my on-stage interview with Ginsburg last September, I asked her 
whether her chief goal had been to challenge separate spheres. She 
replied, “Of course that’s what I was trying to do.”62 
I also asked what was her favorite comfort food.63 Ginsburg thought 
a bit, and then replied that her favorite comfort food was her husband 
Marty’s homemade French bread.64 She loves to talk about how good a 
cook Marty was, and about when Marty and their daughter kicked her 
out of the kitchen because she was such an uninspired cook.65 She also 
loves to tell the story of what she tartly told her son’s school when they 
were calling her constantly as he went through a particularly frisky phase. 
“This child has two parents,” she said. “Next time call his father.”66 She 
tells this story a lot, and repeated it in our interview. She once told a 
reporter that her ideal is well expressed by the 1970s Marlo Thomas song 
“Free to Be You and Me” which inspired her view “[t]hat the male or 
female, you should be free to follow your star, to develop your talent, 
and you shouldn’t be held back by artificial barriers.”67 “But what is very 
hard for most women,” she continues, “is what happens when children 
are born. Will men become equal parents, sharing the joys as well as the 
burdens of bringing up the next generation? But that’s my dream for the 
world, for every child to have two loving parents who share in raising the 
child.”68 
Unlike MacKinnon, whose chief strength is her eloquence in 
deconstructing current institutions, Justice Ginsburg offers a clear 
reconstructive vision. And yet this vision embeds a central ambiguity. 
Often Ginsburg speaks of her ideal as one in which both parents 
participate simultaneously in market work and family work. Yet at other 
times, she seems more focused on making the world safe for role 
switching—for men to be caregivers and women to be breadwinners. She 
often speaks of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld and makes it clear that Stephen 
Wiesenfeld’s devotion to his son deeply touched her.69 “Just as Paula 
 
 61. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on the 1980’s Debate over Special Versus Equal 
Treatment of Women, 4 Law & Ineq. 143, 146 (1986). 
 62. Legally Speaking: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U. Cal. Television (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.uctv.tv/ 
search-details.aspx?showID=22928. 
 63. Id. Many thanks to WorkLife Law Board Member Michele Coleman Mayes for suggesting 
this question.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Ruth Bader Ginsburg Interview: Trailblazing Advocate for Women’s Rights, Acad. of 
Achievement, http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/gin0int-5 (last visited May 1, 2012). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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Wiesenfeld’s status as a breadwinner is devalued so Stephen 
Wiesenfeld’s parental status is denigrated,” said the brief.70 Judges who 
heard the case were extremely skeptical, or downright certain, that 
Stephen Wiesenfeld did not actually want to stay home. The brief 
expressed outrage: 
  Equally myopic, but impossible to explain in light of his own 
contemporaneous pronouncements is appellant’s reference in this 
Court, as in the court below, to appellant’s advanced degrees and his 
ability to command a substantial salary. If Jason Paul’s surviving parent 
were a woman, any suggestion that her academic degrees and 
intellectual capacity indicated she should choose remunerative 
employment over personal attention to her new newborn child 
undoubtedly would be dismissed with alacrity.71 
Whether Ginsburg wants to deconstruct separate spheres or simply 
people them with humans of a different body shape, one thing is clear: 
Like Olof Palme in the 1960s, she has a clear reconstructive vision, to be 
reached by working in coalition with men and placing masculinity at 
center stage.72 When asked why she had chosen to work through the 
ACLU rather than through a women’s organization, said Justice Ginsburg 
in 2009,  
I always thought that there was nothing an antifeminist would want 
more than to have women only in women’s organizations, in their own 
little corner empathizing with each other and not touching a man’s 
world. If you’re going to change things, you have to be with the people 
who hold the levers.73  
A Washington Post reporter who interviewed Ginsburg in 1993 noted a 
photograph of her son-in-law “gazing adoringly at his newborn child.”74 
The reporter quotes her as telling visitors, “This is my dream for 
society . . . . Fathers loving and caring for and helping to raise their 
kids.”75 Ginsburg’s focus on men explains her opposition to “special 
treatment” for women. “Special benefits for women . . . result in 
discriminatory treatment of similarly situated men, themselves victims of 
 
 70. Brief for Appellee at 11–12, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1974) (No. 73-1892). 
 71. Id. at 21–22 (citations omitted). 
 72. Franklin, supra note 9, at 101–02; see Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 1 (quoting Palme: “[I]n 
order that women shall be emancipated . . . men must also be emancipated.”). 
 73. Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court: An Interview with Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2009, (Magazine), at 22, 25; see Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform 
Litigation and Its Challenges: An Essay in Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 Harv. J.L. & 
Gender 251, 265–66 (2009). 
 74. David Von Drehle, Redefining Fair with a Simple, Careful Assault, Wash. Post, July 19, 1993, 
at A1. 
 75. Id.; see Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1997, 
(Magazine), at 60, 63 (“This is my dream of the way the world should be . . . . When fathers take equal 
responsibility for the care of their children, that’s when women will truly be liberated.”). 
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male sex-role stereotypes,” she asserted in the Kahn v. Shevin brief,76 
which also noted that “gender-based discrimination frequently impacts 
adversely on both sexes”77 and decried the “fundamental unfairness to 
men as well as women of legislative lines based on sex stereotypes.”78 
This theme emerged again in Orr v. Orr, the case that challenged a 
statute that limited alimony to women: 
The Alabama alimony statute unfairly and unconstitutionally 
discriminates against husbands who elect to stay at home and care for 
the family, or who, relying on their wives’ ability and desire to make 
the major contribution to the financial support of the family, select a 
less remunerative career, or who, because of involuntary disability, are 
necessarily dependent on their wives. 
. . . . 
. . . Thus, for example, a husband who would like to be a poet or a 
painter and whose family can maintain an adequate living standard on 
his wife’s earnings, is discouraged by the Alabama alimony statute 
from fully developing his talent and pursuing his aspiration.79 
That brief also noted, in language reminiscent of Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,80 that “[f]ar more clearly, the 
discrimination visited upon the husband by the Alabama alimony statute 
stamps women as persons assigned a special place in a world controlled 
by men. By steering the husband out of the home, it steers the wife into it 
and keeps her there, thus discouraging wives from achieving economic 
self-sufficiency.”81 
In the light of Ginsburg’s early briefs, it becomes clear that her 
greatest Supreme Court triumph was not United States v. Virginia,82 as I 
had always assumed. It was Hibbs, written by Justice Rehnquist, which 
upheld the constitutionality of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(“FMLA”) as applied to state governments.83 In the light of Cary 
Franklin’s work, Hibbs can be seen as channeling Ginsburg’s 
reconstructive vision, virtually unchanged since the 1960s. Like many of 
the cases that the Women’s Rights Project took on, Hibbs involved a 
 
 76. Brief for Appellants, supra note 29, at 4. 
 77. Id. at 12. 
 78. Id. at 13. 
 79. Motion of ACLU for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae, Orr v. Orr, 
440 U.S. 268 (1979) (No. 77-1119), 1978 WL 206698, at *14, *18. 
 80. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 81. Motion of ACLU, supra note 79, at 27. 
 82. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 83. 538 U.S. 721. I have to admit that Justice Ginsburg herself does not agree. See Remarks of 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, March 11, 2004, CUNY School of Law, 7 N.Y. City L. Rev. 221, 236 (2004) 
(“[T]he Virginia Military Academy case was very satisfying because I regard it . . . [as] the culmination 
of the litigation in which I was engaged in the 1970s.”). 
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man who wanted to care for a family member.84 William Hibbs, who 
worked for the state welfare department, was fired when he took time off 
to care for his wife after she was very seriously injured in an auto 
accident.85 Much to the astonishment of constitutional law scholars, 
Rehnquist limited the federalism doctrine he himself had championed, 
which used the Tenth Amendment to reign in Congressional power.86 
Ginsburg’s handprints are all over Hibbs.87 It involved a statute 
Ginsburg cared deeply about: the FMLA, championed by Judith 
Lichtman’s Women’s Legal Defense Fund (now the National Partnership 
for Women and Families). Lichtman had co-authored some of the early 
Women’s Rights Project briefs with Ginsburg and had hung tough, 
resisting pressure to accept a national maternity leave statute in favor of 
a statute that applied to men as well as women. This was a controversial 
move, but it is one Ginsburg has defended. For her, the FMLA expresses 
a key tenet of reconstructive feminism: Ginsburg sees the FMLA as 
reflecting not a commitment to treat men and women the same, but a 
commitment to change existing masculine norms, substituting new norms 
that include the experience of women.88 The FMLA does this, she would 
argue, because it changes the definition of the ideal worker by sending 
the message that caregiving—both self-care and care of others—naturally 
plays a role in adults’ lives, and that employers should be prohibited 
from penalizing adults who need time off for caregiving.89 
Ginsburg had been arguing as much since the 1970s. In her 1971 
article Gender and the Constitution, she argued that women needed 
“affirmative action” in order to achieve true equality.90 The “overriding 
objective must be an end to role delineation by gender, and in its place, 
conduct at every school level, [and] later in the job market, signaling that 
in all fields of endeavor females are welcomed as enthusiastically as 
males are.”91 What this entailed was not to treat men and women the 
same in the face of norms designed around men, in the way that “formed 
 
 84. 538 U.S. at 725. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Jennifer Yatskis Dukart, Geduldig Reborn: Hibbs as a Success (?) of Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg’s Sex-Discrimination Strategy, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 541, 544–55 (2005). 
 87. Others have made the same observation. See, e.g., id.; Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Listen 
to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 7 N.Y. City. L. Rev. 213, 218–19 (2004). 
 88. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of 
the 1970s, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 9, 18 (“[The FMLA] . . . takes women at work as the model . . . but 
spreads out to shelter others: men and women who need time off not only to care for a newborn, but 
to attend to a seriously ill child, spouse, elderly parent or self.”); cf. Williams, supra note 49, at 77–108 
(discussing the need to deconstruct masculine workplace norms and replace them with norms that 
include the traditional life patterns of women). 
 89. Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 29. 
 90. Id. at 28–34. 
 91. Id. at 29. 
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equality” feminists have often been characterized. Her goal, instead, was 
“eliminating institutional practices that limit or discourage female 
participation.”92 For example: 
[D]eferral of an education to raise a family or to finance the education 
of a spouse might be regarded with the same favor as accomplishments 
of college athletes or politicians. . . . Extended study programs might 
be provided for students unable to undertake full-time study because 
of special family obligations that cannot be met by customary financial 
aid (notably, care of preschool children).93 
Later on in the same article, Ginsburg wrote, “If we are genuinely 
committed to the eradication of gender-based discrimination, the 
problem of job and income security for childbearing women workers 
must be confronted and resolved head-on.”94 Comparative evidence “may 
be useful”: she goes on to advocate (in the politest possible terms) for 
“comprehensive income protection and medical benefits for pregnancy 
and childbirth, financed through compulsory social insurance,” parental 
leaves that can be taken by men or women, and comprehensive, non-
means-tested child care.95 She argued (as I did thirty years later)96 that it 
is inconsistent with a commitment to gender equality to privatize the 
costs of childrearing onto mothers, making the mothers’ “choice” to quit 
less of a choice than a response to a workplace designed (to use my 
terminology) around an ideal worker who takes no time off for 
childbearing, childrearing, or anything else: someone with a man’s body 
and traditional (breadwinner) life pattern.97 “We will continue to 
shortchange parents, particularly mothers, and children until childrearing 
burdens are distributed more evenly among parents, their employers, 
and the tax-paying public.”98 In other words, Ginsburg—like a true 
reconstructive feminist—defines equality as treating men and women the 
same but only after deconstructing the existing norms defined by and 
around men and masculinity, and reconstructing existing institutions in 
ways that include the bodies and traditional life patterns of women. 
This is the theoretical framework Rehnquist adopts in Hibbs.99 He 
took what seemed at first glance a workers’ rights statute that gives all 
eligible employees up to twelve weeks off a year to care for one’s self or 
 
 92. Id. at 30. 
 93. Id. at 31. 
 94. Id. at 38. 
 95. Id.  
 96. See generally Williams, supra note 10. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 40. 
 99. See generally Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, You’ve 
Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1871 (2006). 
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a family member with a serious health condition100 and defended it as a 
gender bias statute, thereby allowing him to apply intermediate scrutiny 
and uphold its constitutionality.101 Both Rehnquist’s language and his 
logic come right out of the Women’s Rights Project briefs of thirty years 
earlier.102 He decried the “stereotype-based beliefs about the allocation 
of family duties [that have] remained firmly rooted”103 and noted that 
seven states’ leave statutes reinforced stereotypes by offering maternity 
leave for women but no leave for men, “reinforc[ing] the very 
stereotypes that Congress sought to remedy through the FMLA.”104 Like 
Ginsburg before him, Rehnquist focused on men, noting that “[p]arental 
leave for fathers . . . is rare. Even . . . [w]here child-care leave policies do 
exist, men, both in the public and private sectors, receive notoriously 
discriminatory treatment . . . .”105 Rehnquist decried “the pervasive 
presumption that women are mothers first, and workers second,”106 
concluding: 
  Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel 
stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men. . . . 
These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of 
discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the role of 
primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical views 
about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.107 
I do not doubt that Justice Rehnquist had his own life experiences 
that led him to recognize the importance of family caregiving: his wife 
died of cancer when she was still relatively young, and he sometimes left 
early from the Supreme Court to pick up his grandchild from day care in 
order to help his divorced daughter.108 But I have little doubt that 
 
 100. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2010); see Ronald D. Elving, Conflict and Compromise: How Congress 
Makes the Law 18–21 (1995) (discussing that Washington feminists opposed the maternity leave 
advocated by a California Congressman and held out for the FMLA). 
 101. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725. 
 102. See supra text accompanying notes 15–40. 
 103. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730. 
 104. Id. at 733. 
 105. See id. at 731 (emphasis and alternations in original) (quoting Parental and Medical Leave Act 
of 1986: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor 
Standards of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong. 147 (1986) (statement of Meryl Frank, 
Director of the Yale Bush Center Infant Care Leave Project)). 
 106. Id. at 736 (quoting Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on 
Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong. 100 (1986) (statement of Meryl Frank, Director of the Yale Bush Center 
Infant Care Leave Project)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Linda Greenhouse, Heartfelt Words from the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. Times, July 6, 2003, at 
WK3 (“[Chief Justice Rehnquist’s] daughter, Janet, is a single mother who until recently held a high-
pressure job and sometimes had child-care problems. Several times this term, the 78-year-old Chief 
Justice of the United States left work early to pick up his granddaughters from school.”). 
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Ginsburg helped him interpret these experiences in a reconstructive vein. 
She is one charming and persuasive lady. 
When MacKinnon protested in 1987 that “[p]articularly in its upper 
reaches, much of what has passed for feminism in law has been the 
attempt to get for men what little has been reserved for women,” she was 
embracing the then-current view of Ginsburg as obsessed with formal 
equality for exceptional women who followed traditionally male life 
patterns.109 MacKinnon, along with other feminist scholars, now 
recognizes Ginsburg’s antisubordination frame.110 But, as discussed, 
Ginsburg’s antisubordination frame is very different from MacKinnon’s—
so different that lumping them together is likely to prove confusing. 
At issue is not simply the interpretation of Ginsburg. The larger 
point is that the conventional association of antisubordination with 
MacKinnon is oversimplistic. In fact, virtually every mainstream legal 
feminist embraces antisubordination as a goal. This is true not only of 
MacKinnon and Justice Ginsburg. It is also true of Carol Gilligan, whose 
work was designed to end the subordination of what Gilligan saw as 
women’s ways of reasoning and women’s different voice.111 Gilligan, at 
core, protests the devaluation of the feminine, and its subordination to 
values associated with men and masculinity.112 It is time to recognize that 
antisubordination logic underlies every major school of legal feminism. 
III.  Reconstructive Feminism: Next Steps 
A. Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution: Gender 
Pressures on Men 
As noted above, the antistereotyping vision in Sweden proposed 
structural changes to enable both men and women to live up to their full 
potential as human beings. In 1970, Olof Palme, one of the leaders of the 
sex equality movement and later Prime Minister of Sweden, delivered his 
manifesto “The Emancipation of Man”: “[I]n order that women shall be 
emancipated from their antiquated role the men must also be 
emancipated.”113 Palme explained, “[T]he culturally conditioned 
expectations of an individual on account of sex[] act as a sort of 
 
 109. MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 4. 
 110. Catharine A. MacKinnon, A Love Letter to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 31 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 
177, 181 (2010). 
 111. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development 
1–5 (1982). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Franklin, supra note 9, at 101–02 (alteration in original) (quoting Olof Palme, Swed. Prime 
Minister, The Emancipation of Man, Address Before the Women’s National Democratic Club (June 8, 
1970), in Kenneth M. Davidson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Herma H. Kay, Text, Cases and 
Materials on Sex-Based Discrimination 938 (1974)). 
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uniform,”114 forcing men to comply with sex role stereotypes. In fact, 
Palme argued, “the emancipation of men was the linchpin in the struggle 
for sex equality.”115 
We need to listen up. In the thirty years since the Women’s Rights 
Project litigated its landmark cases in the 1970s, the gender revolution 
has stalled out in a big way. Men’s household contributions stalled out 
around 1985.116 Mothers still spend nearly twice as much time as fathers 
both doing core household tasks and caring for children as a primary 
activity.117 About five years after fathers’ family work stalled out, 
women’s workforce participation did, too.118 One out of every four 
mothers aged twenty-five to forty-four remains out of the labor force, 
and women’s average work hours remain far below full-time in an 
economy that severely penalizes “part-time” work.119 Sex segregation has 
decreased sharply for college graduates, but for other women it remains 
very high, and has changed little since the 1990s.120 
To jumpstart the stalled gender revolution, I have argued elsewhere, 
we need to change gender pressures on men.121 The conventional wisdom 
is that the persistence of work-family conflict reflects women’s failure to 
bargain effectively in the family.122 My hypothesis, instead, is that the 
stalled gender revolution reflects the fact that gender pressures on men 
remain largely unchanged. 
These pressures are intense. Unlike womanhood, which is 
understood to be a biological inevitability, manhood is seen as something 
that has to be earned.123 Manhood is both elusive and tenuous—
something that has to be proven in public, over and over again.124 This 
leads to “gender role stress,” which in many men is chronic: anxiety over 
whether one is enough of a man.125 Actions that provide temporary relief 
from this anxiety include “drinking heavily, driving fast, excelling at 
 
 114. Id. at 102 (quoting Olof Palme, Swed. Prime Minister, The Emancipation of Man, Address 
Before the Women’s National Democratic Club (June 8, 1970), in Kenneth M. Davidson, Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg & Herma H. Kay, Text, Cases and Materials on Sex-Based Discrimination 941 
(1974)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Joan C. Williams et al., “Opt Out” or Pushed Out?: How the Press Covers Work/Family 
Conflict 20 (2006). 
 117. Id. at 20. 
 118. Id. at 21 fig.3. 
 119. Williams, supra note 10, at 2. 
 120. Williams et al., supra note 116, at 23 fig.7. 
 121. Williams, supra note 49.  
 122. Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gender 
Divide 180–85 (2003). 
 123. Joseph Vandello et al., Precarious Manhood, 95 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1325, 1325–
26 (2008). 
 124. Id. at 1326–27. 
 125. Id. at 1327. 
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sports, making lots of money, bragging about their sexual exploits, and 
fathering many children,” according to experimental social psychologist 
Joseph A. Vandello and his colleagues.126 
For most men, manhood remains intertwined with breadwinning. 
Historians point out that when masculinity first became associated with 
breadwinner status in the nineteenth century, anxiety became men’s 
heritage. “Sons had to compete for manhood in the market rather than 
grow into secure manhood by replicating fathers,” to quote one 
historian.127 “The birthright of every American male is a chronic sense of 
personal inadequacy,” chimed in another twentieth-century author.128 
The bulwark against inadequacy is to be “successful,” which means to be 
successful at work. This makes it difficult for men to challenge the felt 
mandate to live up to workplace norms. “I was talking to a friend of 
mine, a partner at a major San Francisco law firm,” Derek Bok, former 
president of Harvard University, told me in 2001. “He was always 
complaining about how hard he worked, so I asked: ‘Then why don’t you 
just work three-fifths as hard and take three-fifths the salary?’ He was 
tongue-tied. But of course the real reason he couldn’t is that then he 
feared he wouldn’t ‘be a player.’”129 This single quote goes a long way 
toward explaining the provenance of work-family conflict among the 
professional-managerial class.130 
In sociologist Pamela Stone’s study of highly educated women who 
“opted out,” she found that husbands were a key influence on well over 
half (sixty percent) of women’s decisions to quit.131 The “unspoken 
backdrop against which these women’s decisions to quit are negotiated 
and decided” is that men’s careers take precedence.132 As one mother put 
it, explaining why she left her high-level job, “[My husband and I] were 
both working these killer jobs. And I kept saying, we need to reconfigure 
this. And what I realized was, he wasn’t going to.”133 Said one woman, 
“He has always said to me, ‘You can do whatever you want to do.’ But 
he’s not there to pick up any load.”134 These kinds of statements show the 
flawed logic of the oft-repeated assertion that women just need to 
 
 126. Id.  
 127. Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815–1846, at 246 (1991). 
 128. Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, in The Gender of Desire: Essays on Male 
Sexuality 35 (2005). 
 129. Email from Derek Bok, Professor, Harvard Univ., to Author (2007) (on file with Author) 
(confirming statements made in 2010). 
 130. For a discussion of gender pressures on blue-collar men, see Williams, supra note 49, at 83–86. 
 131. Pamela Stone, Opting Out? Why Women Really Quit Careers and Head Home 62 (2007). 
 132. Id. at 65. 
 133. Id. at 61. 
 134. Pamela Stone & Meg Lovejoy, Fast-Track Women and the “Choice” to Stay Home, 
596 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 62, 76 (2004). 
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bargain better at home if they want equality at work. Women are fated to 
lose on home-front negotiations so long as gender pressures on men 
remain unchanged. 
Men often say they want to spend more time with their families, and 
have for a long time. Why don’t most deliver? Most feel they cannot 
afford not to be a “player”: men not only have the right to perform as 
ideal workers; most feel they have the duty to do so. According to a 1997 
study, eighty-three percent of American women and an even higher 
percentage of childrearing mothers felt their husbands should be the 
primary providers.135 Americans see being a good provider as an integral 
part of being a good father, according to another study; gender pressures 
on men to be good fathers send them away from home, rather than 
towards it.136 
Sad to say, feminism has not made things any easier. In fact, the 
mainstream formulation is that feminism is about choices: A woman 
should be able to choose whether she stays home or whether she 
continues working. Think about it—the assumption is that women are 
entitled to be supported by a man if they choose to be. Even feminism 
has played a role in policing men into breadwinner roles. 
To jumpstart the stalled gender revolution on the home front, we 
need to open up a discussion about gender pressures on men at work. 
These pressures are not subtle. To quote an engineer in Silicon Valley: 
Guys constantly try to out-macho each other, but in engineering it’s 
really perverted because out-machoing someone means being more of 
a nerd than the other person. . . . It’s not like being a brave firefighter 
and going up one more flight than your friend. There’s a lot of see how 
many hours I can work whether or not you have a kid. . . . He’s a real 
man; he works 90-hour weeks. He’s a slacker; he works 50 hours a 
week.137 
A key place men earn their manhood is on the job. Marianne Cooper’s 
brilliant study of Silicon Valley, “Being the ‘Go-To Guy,’” details this 
process in the white-collar context.138 She shows that white-collar men 
enact masculinity on the job, in a way that contests blue-collar men’s 
claims that being a “real man” requires having the brute strength to do 
 
 135. Williams, supra note 10, at 27 (quoting Jean L. Potuchek, Who Supports the Family? 4 
(1997)). 
 136. See generally Nicholas Townsend, The Package Deal: Marriage, Work and Fatherhood 
in Men’s Lives (2002). 
 137. Marianne Cooper, Being the “Go-To Guy”: Fatherhood, Masculinity, and the Organization of 
Work in Silicon Valley, in Families at Work: Expanding the Bounds 7 (Naomi Gerstel et al. eds., 
2002) (quoting engineer Scott Webster). For an example of the somewhat different ways gender 
pressures on men operate in the blue-collar context, see Williams, supra note 49, 56–61 (discussing 
“caring in secret” among blue-collar men). 
 138. See generally Cooper, supra note 137 (discussing masculinity as performed in white-collar jobs). 
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hard, dirty jobs.139 This is a source of anxiety, because white-collar men’s 
work is clean, gender-neutral knowledge work—pencil pushing—which 
leaves white-collar men eager to shift the definition of manliness. 
One way they do so is by interpreting long work hours as a heroic 
activity (“He’s a real man; he works 90-hour weeks.”).140 Another example: 
Even under normal circumstances, when there are no extraordinary 
demands, you see people working 36 hours straight just because they 
are going to meet the deadline. They are going to get it done, and 
everybody walks around proud of how exhausted they were last week 
and conspicuously putting in wild hours. It’s a status thing to have pizza 
delivered to the office. So I don’t know why it happens, but I really feel 
like it is kind of a machismo thing: I’m tough. I can do this thing. Yeah, 
I’m tired, but I’m on top of it. You guys don’t worry about me. . . . The 
people who conspicuously overwork are guys, and I think it’s usually 
for the benefit of other guys.141 
“The successful enactment of this masculinity,” Cooper writes, “involves 
displaying one’s exhaustion, physically and verbally, in order to convey 
the depth of one’s commitment, stamina, and virility.”142 
Common, but unconvincing, are claims that this kind of peacocking 
is efficient. Much of the time, Cooper points out, Silicon Valley 
engineers’ schedule reflect a simple lack of planning: “Remarkably, poor 
planning is reinterpreted as a test of will, a test of manhood for a team of 
engineers.”143 Failure to delegate is widespread: “[M]ost of them don’t 
know how to delegate,” one informant remarks of his colleagues.144 Also 
accepted is overwork to the point of inefficiency: “My god, I mean, talk 
about sweatshops. I mean, they are oblivious. The managers have no idea 
what an altered state they are in all the time while they are managing 
these guys.”145 Extensive research documents that sleep deprivation 
corrodes performance, and that constant stress leads to higher health 
insurance costs.146 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 7. 
 141. Id. at 9 (quoting Kirk Sinclair). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 10. 
 144. Id. at 14. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Stanley Coren, Sleep Deprivation, Psychosis and Mental Efficiency, Psychiatric Times, 
Mar. 1, 1998, at 15 (“People who are operating with a sleep debt are less efficient, and this inefficiency 
is most noticeable when the circadian cycle is at its lowest ebb. Among the common consequences of a 
large sleep debt are attentional lapses, reduced short-term memory capacity, impaired judgment and the 
occurrence of ‘microsleeps.’”); Emily Tanner-Smith & Adam Long, The Stress-Health Connection and 
Its Implications for Employers, Managed Care Outlook, May 15, 2008, at 21; Mary Corbitt Clark, The 
Cost of Job Stress, Winning Workplaces (Feb. 17, 2012, 5:13 PM), http://www.winningworkplaces.org/ 
library/features/the_cost_of_job_stress.php (“Job stress is a key driver of health care costs. . . . [H]ealth 
care expenditures are nearly 50 percent greater for workers reporting high levels of stress.”). 
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All this holds important messages for feminism. If manhood is 
forged on the job, then clearing up the confusion between masculine 
gender performance and productivity becomes a crucial part of the 
feminist agenda. So does developing the case law that allows men to sue 
when gender discrimination against men is triggered by their perceived 
failure to fulfill the mandated masculine role.147 
B.  Litigating Separate Spheres Through Title VII 
If one key component of reconstructive feminism is to change the 
gender pressures that police men into the breadwinner role, another is to 
change the gender pressures that police women out of that role, most 
notably gender bias against mothers.148 Recent studies suggest that this 
kind of “maternal wall” bias is alive and well. It may well be the 
strongest form of gender discrimination in today’s workplace. The 
leading study gave subjects resumes identical in every way except that 
one, but not the other, was a mother.149 The study found that mothers were 
79% less likely to be hired, 100% less likely to be promoted, offered an 
average of $11,000 less in salary, and held to higher performance and 
punctuality standards than otherwise identical nonmothers.150 Numerous 
other studies confirm this finding, which suggests maternal wall bias 
against mothers is by far the strongest type of gender bias, many times 
stronger than the glass ceiling bias triggered by being a woman.151 
Separate spheres ideology operates to trigger strong negative 
competence and commitment assumptions against mothers even if they 
perform at precisely the same level they performed before they had 
children.152 When mothers are perceived as ideal workers, another study 
found, they nonetheless encounter bias at work based on the assumption 
that if they are ideal workers, they must be bad mothers.153 
This sex-role stereotyping sometimes operates precisely the way the 
stereotyping functioned in the ACLU cases of the 1970s: stereotyping 
that stems from overgeneralization from the norm. “[S]tereotype is not a 
 
 147. See generally Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family 
Conflicts of Men, 63 Hastings L.J. 1297 (2012). 
 148. Acad. of Achievement, supra note 68, at 5 (“But what is very hard for most women is what 
happens when children are born. Will men become equal parents, sharing the joys as well as the 
burdens for bringing up the next generation? But that’s my dream for the world, for every child to 
have two loving parents who share in raising the child.”). 
 149. Correll, Benard & Paik, supra note 11, at 1309. 
 150. Id. at 1316 tbl.1. 
 151. See generally Stephen Benard, In Paik & Shelley J. Correll, Cognitive Bias and the 
Motherhood Penalty, 59 Hastings L.J. 1359 (2008) (reviewing the literature). 
 152. Correll, Benard & Paik, supra note 11, at 1326. 
 153. Stephen Benard & Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discrimination and the Motherhood Penalty, 
25 Gender & Soc’y 616, 621 (2010). 
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synonym for mistake or false impression. It identifies the average,” read 
Ginsburg’s 1974 brief in Califano v. Westcott, a case involving a challenge 
to a welfare program that offered benefits to families with unemployed 
fathers but not to those with unemployed mothers.154 In that same year, 
the brief in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld noted that propositions such as that 
“wives are typically dependent” (in Frontiero) and “men typically have 
more business experience” (in Reed v. Reed) “concededly may be 
reasonable as highly generalized solutions.”155 
The issue in all of those cases is the reasonableness of treating the 
substantial population of individuals and families who do not match the 
gross generalization as if they did match it.156 The 1978 brief in Orr v. 
Orr, which involved a challenge to a state statute that offered alimony 
only to women, argued, “The sharp sex line [the statute] draws reinforces 
‘the role-typing society has long imposed’ upon men and women 
[husband at work, wife at home] and invidiously discriminates against 
spouses who do not conform to this type casting.”157 Again in the case 
that became Frontiero v. Richardson, the brief noted, “The challenged 
classification, which assumes that the man is the dominant partner in a 
marriage and that the woman occupies a subordinate position . . . . 
reinforce[s] restrictive and outdated sex-role stereotypes and penalize[s] 
married women who do not conform to the assumed general pattern.”158 
Again in 1996, Ginsburg wrote, “I am fearful, or suspicious, of 
generalizations about the way women or men are. My life’s experience 
indicates that they cannot guide me reliably in making decisions about 
particular individuals.”159 
Yet assumptions that exceptional mothers will conform to the norm 
is only one way gender stereotyping works. Maternal wall bias also 
disadvantages mothers in at least two other ways. As the studies by 
Shelley Correll, Stephen Benard, In Paik, and their colleagues 
demonstrate, maternal wall bias often stems from prescriptive bias, in the 
form of backlash against mothers who are seen as too devoted to work, 
in violation of the prescription that mothers’ lives should revolve around 
their children.160 A third form of maternal wall bias reflects the automatic 
association of mothers with a lack of workplace competence and 
commitment, which reflects separate spheres’ linkage of motherhood 
 
 154. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae at 32, Califano v. 
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (No.78-689). 
 155. Brief for Appellee, supra note 70, at 18 n.11. 
 156. Id. at 18 n.12. 
 157. Motion of ACLU, supra note 79, at 13 (citation omitted) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 
421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975)). 
 158. Brief of ACLU, supra note 17, at 24. 
 159. Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 148. 
 160. See Benard & Correll, supra note 153, at 1385; Correll, Benard & Paik, supra note 11, at 1326. 
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with family work, not market work.161 The social science has progressed 
far beyond where it was in the 1970s. 
This new social science paved the way for the EEOC’s 2007 
enforcement guidance on caregiver discrimination, which asserted that 
discrimination against caregivers is a form of gender discrimination.162 
This was important because, in some prior case law, employers faced 
with a lawsuit charging discrimination against mothers promoted a 
woman without children and claimed that action as proof they were not 
discriminating against women.163 The EEOC’s guidance also helped to 
address situations where mothers’ lawsuits were dismissed on the 
grounds that the plaintiff could point to no similarly situated man 
(“comparator”).164 By clearly stating that caregiver-bias lawsuits could be 
proven through stereotyping evidence alone, even in the absence of a 
comparator, the EEOC addressed these problems.165 The EEOC’s 
embrace of stereotyping evidence was important not only because 
comparators can be difficult to find, but also because stereotyping often 
is easy to prove. In the landmark early case of Back v. Hastings on 
Hudson Union Free School District, a school psychologist was told that 
she was not a suitable candidate for tenure because “[she] had little ones 
at home.”166 Many other cases involve open bias against mothers, as when 
an employer told a car salesman she should “do the right thing” and stay 
home with her children, and that as a woman with a family she would 
always be at a disadvantage at the dealership.167 The prevalence of such 
comments in the case law suggests they are common in today’s 
workplace.168 
Family responsibilities discrimination cases increased almost 400% 
in the ten years from 1999 to 2009, and have higher success rates than do 
most other forms of employment litigation.169 A recent important 
development is a large class-action win: A jury awarded $256 million 
 
 161. Correll, Benard & Paik, supra note 11, at 1306. 
 162. EEOC, supra note 12, § II. 
 163. E.g., Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 WL 912101, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998). 
 164. Compare Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 739 (1994) (finding that the plaintiff’s 
“failure to present any comparator evidence doomed her case” despite having been told that she was 
terminated because the human resources manager did not believe she would return to work after 
maternity leave), with EEOC, supra note 12, § II(A)(3) (discussing assumptions about the work 
performance of female caregivers). 
 165. EEOC, supra note 12, § II(A)(3). 
 166. 365 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original). 
 167. Plaetzer v. Borton Auto., Inc., No. Civ. 02-3089 JRT/JSM, 2004 WL 2066770, at *1 (D. Minn. 
Aug. 13, 2004).  
 168. See generally Cynthia Thomas Calvert, The Ctr. for WorkLife Law, Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination: Litigation Update 2010 (2010); Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Gary 
Phelan & Joan C. Williams, Family Responsibilities Discrimination (forthcoming 2012). 
 169. Calvert, supra note 168, at 9, 11. 
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against Novartis in a case that combined caregiver discrimination with 
sexual harassment and other, more conventional forms of gender 
discrimination.170  
I will conclude this Article with a discussion of a recent pattern-and-
practice case out of the Southern District of New York, EEOC v. 
Bloomberg L.P.,171 which represents a setback for mothers and raises 
issues straight out of the Ginsburg briefs of the 1970s. Ample evidence in 
Bloomberg illustrated that the maternal wall bias was particularly strong, 
according to allegations by the claimants.172 All of the statements that 
follow are based on these allegations. When one claimant told former 
boss Michael Bloomberg she was pregnant, his answer was a simple: “kill 
it.”173 Allowing mothers flexible work arrangements, he reportedly 
commented, was like allowing a man time off to practice his golf swing.174 
The CEO who took over after Bloomberg left the company, Lex 
Fenwick, allegedly demanded that managers “get rid of these pregnant 
bitches” (referring to two women on maternity leave).175 In response to a 
human resources manager who complained about this outburst, Fenwick 
asked, “[W]ell, is every fucking woman in the company having a baby or 
going to have a baby?”176 Fenwick also opined that, unless mother or 
child has a health issue, “there’s absolutely no reason for someone to 
take paternity leave.”177 The Head of News commented that “half these 
fuckin’ people take the [maternity] leave and they don’t even come back. 
It’s like stealing money from Mike Bloomberg’s wallet. It’s theft. They 
should be arrested.”178 The Head of Global Data allegedly asked, “Who 
would want to work with an office full of women?”179 When a female 
employee complained to the President of Tradebook Sales about her 
pay, he asked, “[C]an’t you just be happy being pregnant?”180 These 
comments suggest that the separate spheres ideology was alive and well 
at Bloomberg. 
 
 170. Velez v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 244 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The case subsequently 
settled for $175 million. Judy Greenwald, In 2010, Bias Cases Dominate Employment Legal 
Landscape, Bus. Ins., Jan. 10, 2011, at 4. 
 171. 778 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 172. EEOC’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Bloomberg L.P.’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to EEOC’s Pattern-or-Practice Claim, Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d 458 (No. 07-
8383). 
 173. Id. at 2. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 3. 
 176. Id. at 4. 
 177. Id. at 3. 
 178. Id. at 4. 
 179. Id. at 5. 
 180. Id. at 4. 
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Yet federal Judge Loretta Preska granted summary judgment for 
Bloomberg in an opinion that seemed designed to clear Bloomberg’s 
reputation in the press. “In a heralded complaint,” her opinion begins, 
“the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission accused 
Bloomberg L.P. of engaging in a pattern or practice of discrimination 
against pregnant employees or those who have recently returned from 
maternity leave . . . . However, ‘J’accuse!’ is not enough in court. 
Evidence is required.”181 She continued: “As its standard operating 
procedure Bloomberg increased compensation for women returning 
from maternity leave more than for those who took similarly lengthy 
leaves and did not reduce the responsibilities of women returning from 
maternity leave any more than of those who took similarly lengthy 
leaves.”182 
The informed reader is left wondering whether Judge Preska is 
reaching a merits determination after weighing competing evidence. If 
so, that is an intriguing development in a motion for summary judgment, 
a situation in which the judge is not authorized to weigh competing 
versions of the facts. Of course, a news reporter reading the decision 
typically would know none of this. 
The beginning of Judge Preska’s opinion (the part reporters would 
read) intimates that the EEOC had no, or very little, evidence.183 The 
opinion presents the statistical evidence of Bloomberg’s experts, 
followed by the statement that, “[a]gainst this data, the EEOC has 
presented anecdotal testimony from several claimants stating that they 
were discriminated against in terms of compensation.”184 This makes it 
sound as if the EEOC had submitted no statistical evidence. Only much 
later, in a footnote, does Judge Preska mention that the reason the 
EEOC had only anecdotal evidence is that Judge Preska had excluded all 
of the EEOC’s expert evidence while allowing in all of Bloomberg’s.185 
Even in that footnote, Judge Preska makes it sound as if the EEOC’s 
experts agreed with the conclusions of Bloomberg’s expert, which they 
did not: “The EEOC disputes the ‘analysis’ of [Bloomberg’s] experts, but 
it does not dispute the statements contained in the reports.”186 Only one 
of the many shocking statements by officers at the highest levels of 
Bloomberg is mentioned, and it is buried toward the end of the 
 
 181. EEOC v. Bloomberg, L.P., 778 F. Supp. 2d 458, 461–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 182. Id. at 462. 
 183. Id. at 461–62. 
 184. Id. at 465 (emphasis added). 
 185. Id. at 464 n.3. The EEOC’s statistical evidence compared mothers to other leave-takers and 
found pay and promotion discrimination against mothers. EEOC’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition 
to Defendant’s Bloomberg L.P.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 172, at 15, 18. 
 186. Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 464 n.3.  
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opinion.187 Instead, Judge Preska intimates that the EEOC’s case 
consisted of colorless claims by certain class members that they were not 
promoted or that their compensation was decreased following their 
return from maternity leave, and concludes, “Generally, all of these 
assertions, taken together, boil down to the EEOC’s conclusion that 
Bloomberg management is predominantly male, and has tended to 
follow Wall Street’s model of having few women in top management 
positions.”188 
Bloomberg’s lawyers argued successfully to exclude many of the 
statements quoted above on the grounds that they were hearsay. Judge 
Preska’s opinion neglects to mention that many of the offending 
statements were made by high-ranking company officials. Surely such 
highly placed officials had authority to make these statements or made 
them within the scope of their employment. Accordingly, those 
statements were party admissions—not hearsay.189 Other key statements, 
such as the statement by the head of human resources that “the problem 
with women is that they go off and have babies,” were not hearsay 
because they were not offered to prove that women irresponsibly go off 
and have babies, but rather to show the speaker’s bias.190 Again, Judge 
Preska’s opinion functions quite nicely to send the message to the world 
that Bloomberg’s reputation had been unjustly besmirched. 
What Judge Preska appeared to be concerned about was the 
“inflammatory” nature of the statements by high-level Bloomberg 
corporate officials. One wonders whether the jury would have been 
inflamed—and, if so, whether it would have been due to the blatantly 
discriminatory nature of many of the comments of managers at 
Bloomberg. The legal issue is whether the potential prejudice substantially 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence.191 If the judge’s opinion had 
focused on this issue, however, it would not have succeeded in conveying 
the message that Bloomberg’s reputation had been unjustly besmirched. 
Even more troubling is the little sermon Judge Preska offered at the 
end of her opinion. “At bottom, the EEOC’s theory of this case is about 
so-called ‘work-life balance.’. . . [The EEOC’s claim] amounts to a 
judgment that Bloomberg, as a company policy, does not provide its 
employee-mothers with a sufficient work-life balance.”192 She quotes 
 
 187. Id. at 479. 
 188. Id. at 466 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 189. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (providing that party admissions are not hearsay, and that when a 
corporation is a party opponent, a declarant’s statement is not hearsay if made while she was acting 
within her scope of employment or with proper authority). 
 190. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(c) (providing that a statement not introduced to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted cannot be hearsay). 
 191. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
 192. Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 485. 
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former General Electric CEO Jack Welch: “‘There’s no such thing as 
work-life balance. There are work-life choices, and you make them, and 
they have consequences.’”193 Judge Preska defends Mr. Welch’s view, 
which (she says) “reflects the free-market employment system we 
embrace in the United States,” although she then goes on to say it is not 
the role of judges “to engage in policy debates” and that “[t]he law does 
not mandate ‘work-life balance.’ It does not require companies to ignore 
employees’ work-family tradeoffs—and they are tradeoffs—when 
deciding about employee pay and promotions.”194 
This sermon takes us back to the Ginsburg briefs of the 1970s and 
the principle that it is discrimination to treat women who do not conform 
to stereotypes according to the assumption that all women will conform 
to the norm.195 The claimants in this case were not asking for work-life 
balance. They were asking that their employer not discriminate against 
them because they were mothers: not to insult them, exclude them from 
meetings, depress their pay, cease their promotions, or subject them to 
rigid rules that were not applied to nonmothers. Remember the studies 
by Correll, Benard, and Paik: Mothers with identical resumes were 100% 
less likely to be promoted, offered much lower pay, and held to higher 
performance standards.196 The issue here is not a desire for work-life 
balance, but breathtaking evidence of the strongest and most open form 
of discrimination against women. 
The most disturbing thing about Judge Preska’s sermon, however, is 
the insight it provides into her ruling in the Daubert motion in which she 
excluded the evidence of the EEOC’s experts—the ruling that in effect 
decided the case. The EEOC’s statistical evidence used maternity leave 
as a proxy for motherhood and compared the wage growth of women 
who had taken maternity leave with that of everyone at Bloomberg who 
had not taken maternity leave.197 In an unusual move, the judge ruled this 
evidence inadmissible.198 
Judge Preska took the step of excluding the EEOC’s statistical 
evidence because she said it compared the wrong groups.199 She admitted 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as Victims, 11 J. Fam. L. 
347, 349 (1971) (“As long as a woman’s access to equal opportunity could be barred by unproved 
assumptions concerning her inherent disqualifications, she would have no chance to prove those 
assumptions false.”). 
 196. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 197. EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 07 Civ. 8383(LAP), 2010 WL 3466370, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
31, 2011) (order excluding testimony). 
 198. Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 464 n.3. 
 199. Bloomberg, 2010 WL 3466370, at *12 (“[The EEOC’s expert] does not accurately compare 
class members to other similarly situated Bloomberg employees . . . .”). 
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only the evidence from Bloomberg’s statistical expert, which compared 
mothers who had taken leave with other employees who had taken 
leaves of sixty days or more, arguing that this was the correct analysis “to 
compare the class members to similarly situated employees, namely, 
those who have taken a substantial amount of leave.”200 Judge Preska not 
only considered this the relevant comparison, she considered the 
comparison proposed by EEOC’s expert so flawed that his evidence 
should not even be submitted to a jury.201 
There are several problems with her analysis. The first is that this 
comparison is not probative. Comparing leave-takers to leave-takers may 
simply tell you that all leave-takers are being discriminated against, or 
that employees who take maternity leave are being discriminated against 
a little more or a little less than are those who take leave due to other 
serious medical conditions. The fact that leave-takers often are 
discriminated against is so well established that Congress noted it, and 
prohibited it, in the FMLA.202 
A related problem with Judge Preska’s proposed methodology is 
that courts have rejected regression analyses that use, as controls, 
variables that themselves may be affected by the discrimination that is 
being challenged. Thus in James v. Stockham Valves and Fittings, a 
defendant in a race-based wage discrimination case used “skill level” and 
“merit rating” as two factors that helped explain the contested wage 
differentials.203 The court rejected this analysis on the grounds that the 
evidence suggested that African Americans were given lower-skilled jobs 
and lower merit ratings because of race.204 This is sometimes referred to 
as the problem of “tainted variables.”205 In Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., a 
court rejected a regression analysis that controlled for what job the 
plaintiffs started in, on the grounds that because women were 
discriminated against at the time of hiring, controlling for starting job 
was a tainted variable, “one whose value is affected by discrimination 
and has the effect of concealing disparities due to discrimination.”206 
Similarly, a regression analysis that compares leave-takers to leave-
takers is tainted by the discrimination against both mothers and 
individuals with disabilities (the other group most likely to take long 
leaves). 
 
 200. Id. at *7. 
 201. Id. at *12. 
 202. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2010). 
 203. 559 F.2d 310, 332 (5th Cir. 1977).  
 204. Id. at 349. 
 205. Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., Nos. C–94–4335 SI, C–95–2182 SI, 1997 WL 605754, at *10 n.21 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997). 
 206. Id.  
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A third problem with Judge Preska’s insistence on comparing leave-
takers to leave-takers, rather than mothers to others, lies in her 
underlying assumption that employees who have taken leave are not 
comparable, by definition, to those who have never taken leave because 
they are less productive, less dependable, and less committed. She quotes 
with approval the statement of a Bloomberg expert who said, “If a long 
leave has some lasting effect on performance-related factors, such as 
productivity, and therefore on pay, employees with a recent long 
leave . . . are not similarly situated to employees who have never been on 
a long leave.”207 This assumption (without proof from the individual 
workplace in question) that women are less productive once they become 
mothers is precisely the kind of maternal wall stereotyping that courts 
are supposed to be protecting plaintiffs against.  
But the problems do not end there. In light of the judge’s sermon 
about work-life balance, the reasons behind her Daubert ruling become 
clear: She is assuming that an employer is entitled to act on an unproven 
assumption that anyone who takes leave will, upon their return, be less 
productive than anyone who has not taken leave. But acting on that 
assumption without proof violates the FMLA, which prohibits retaliation 
against anyone who has taken a federally protected leave.208 In essence, 
Judge Preska not only has forgotten that the FMLA prohibits retaliation 
against leave-takers, she also puts her seal of approval on precisely this 
kind of retaliation. 
Judge Preska opines that the plaintiffs’ proposed comparison between 
women who have returned from maternity leave and everyone else at 
Bloomberg violates the Pregnancy Discrimination Act because it offers 
special treatment to pregnant women.209 But it offers special treatment to 
women returning from maternity leave only if an employer is prohibited 
from discriminating or retaliating against mothers for taking leave in a 
context where the employer is free to discriminate or retaliate against 
others for taking leave. But, again, the FMLA prohibits discrimination or 
retaliation against anyone who takes a protected leave.210 Therefore, after 
passage of the FMLA in 1994, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s 
insistence that pregnant women be treated “the same” as other employees 
amounts to a requirement that pregnant women (along with other 
employees) not be penalized due to the unsupported assumption that they 
will be less productive upon their return to work. 
 
 207. EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 07 Civ. 8383(LAP), 2010 WL 3466370, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
31, 2011) (order excluding testimony). 
 208. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2010); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 (2011) (describing the FMLA’s prohibitions 
against discrimination and retaliation for taking FMLA leave). 
 209. Bloomberg, 2010 WL 3466370, at *7. 
 210. See U.S.C. § 2615; 29 C.F.R. 825.220. 
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Suffice it to say that the analysis in Bloomberg is severely flawed. 
Any employer who relies on the key evidentiary ruling in Bloomberg will 
weaken its case: Insisting in a maternal wall case that the correct 
comparison is between mothers and other leave-takers because the 
careers of all leave-takers stall out is a virtual admission that the 
company has violated the FMLA.211 
This all brings us back to Justice Ginsburg’s unfinished agenda: to 
ensure that the law does not function to police women into the domestic 
sphere and men out of it. Justice Ginsburg began this process by 
eliminating government programs that explicitly embraced separate 
spheres. But the ACLU cases of the 1970s were only an initial victory in 
a much larger campaign. Today, family responsibilities cases are the front 
line in contesting separate spheres. The EEOC’s enforcement guidance 
on caregiver discrimination articulated a reasonable set of rules about 
how maternal wall suits should be litigated, highlighting the use of 
stereotyping evidence in order to avoid just the kind of thing that 
happened in Bloomberg.212 Judge Preska ignored the EEOC’s guidance; 
by doing so, she fell into the old-fashioned kind of stereotyping Justice 
Ginsburg taught us to avoid. 
Conclusion 
To return to Judge Preska’s opinion, recall her assertion that “[t]he 
law does not mandate ‘work-life balance.’ It does not require companies 
to ignore employees’ work-family tradeoffs—and they are tradeoffs—
when deciding about employee pay and promotions.”213 That’s true. But 
what employers are not allowed to do is discriminate against one group 
of mothers because a different group of mothers decided to leave the fast 
track. As Ginsburg taught us long ago, you cannot penalize women who 
do not conform to stereotypes just because other women do conform. 
We abandon this basic principle at our peril. Doing so would be a truly 
devastating setback for women, given that studies show that what dooms 
women economically in the United States today is not being a woman—it 
is being a mother.214 If the courts refuse to protect mothers on the fast 
 
 211. The reason the choice of comparators is so important is that if the correct comparison is 
between mothers and other people who have taken long leaves, then this will often mean that a 
mother’s case will fail due to her inability to find a suitable comparator or (in a class action) a 
sufficient number of comparators such that she can produce a statistically reliable comparison. This 
takes mothers right back to where they were a decade ago: with no practical way to contest the 
strongest form of gender discrimination in today’s workplace. 
 212. EEOC, supra note 12. 
 213. EEOC v. Bloomberg, L.P., 778 F. Supp. 2d 458, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 214. See Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 Am. Soc. Rev. 
204 (2001) (finding a significant wage penalty); see also Correll, Benard & Paik, supra note 11, at 
1299–1300 (reviewing the literature). 
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track simply because other mothers left the fast track, Justice Ginsburg’s 
reconstructive vision will remain elusive. That’s for damn sure. 
 
